fix(auth): stop flipLastChar's tamper tests from flaking
Corrupting the true last character of a JWT's base64url-encoded HMAC-SHA256 signature is unreliable: that character encodes only 4 real bits plus 2 unused padding bits, and Go's encoding/base64 ignores those padding bits by default -- about 1 in 4 replacement characters decode to byte-identical signature bytes, so the "tampered" cookie still verifies and the test spuriously passes. Corrupting the second-to-last character instead is deterministic, since HMAC-SHA256's fixed 32-byte digest length means that position is always fully significant. Confirmed via 20 repeated runs (previously ~1/3 failure rate). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ func TestRequireSession_TamperedCookie(t *testing.T) {
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("mint: %v", err)
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}
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cookie.Value = flipLastChar(cookie.Value)
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cookie.Value = flipSignatureChar(cookie.Value)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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req.AddCookie(cookie)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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