package auth

import (
	"testing"
	"time"
)

const testSecret = "test-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long!"

func TestMintAndParseSessionCookie(t *testing.T) {
	claims := Claims{Sub: "u1", Name: "Alice", Email: "alice@example.com"}
	cookie, err := MintSessionCookie(claims, "raw-id-token-jwt", []byte(testSecret), time.Hour, true)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("mint: %v", err)
	}
	if cookie.Name != SessionCookieName || !cookie.HttpOnly || !cookie.Secure {
		t.Fatalf("cookie = %+v, want name=%s HttpOnly+Secure", cookie, SessionCookieName)
	}

	got, err := ParseSessionCookie(cookie, []byte(testSecret))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("parse: %v", err)
	}
	if got != claims {
		t.Fatalf("got %+v, want %+v", got, claims)
	}

	// The ID token rides in the cookie apart from Claims, retrievable only
	// through the dedicated logout-path helper.
	idToken, err := IDTokenFromSessionCookie(cookie, []byte(testSecret))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("IDTokenFromSessionCookie: %v", err)
	}
	if idToken != "raw-id-token-jwt" {
		t.Fatalf("idToken = %q, want raw-id-token-jwt", idToken)
	}
}

func TestParseSessionCookie_Expired(t *testing.T) {
	cookie, err := MintSessionCookie(Claims{Sub: "u1"}, "", []byte(testSecret), -time.Hour, false)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("mint: %v", err)
	}
	if _, err := ParseSessionCookie(cookie, []byte(testSecret)); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("expected error for expired cookie")
	}
}

func TestParseSessionCookie_Tampered(t *testing.T) {
	cookie, err := MintSessionCookie(Claims{Sub: "u1"}, "", []byte(testSecret), time.Hour, false)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("mint: %v", err)
	}
	cookie.Value = flipSignatureChar(cookie.Value)
	if _, err := ParseSessionCookie(cookie, []byte(testSecret)); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("expected error for tampered cookie")
	}
}

// flipSignatureChar corrupts a signed JWT for tamper tests by changing the
// second-to-last character of its base64url signature, guaranteeing the
// decoded signature bytes actually change. Two pitfalls to avoid here:
//  1. Blindly overwriting a character with a fixed replacement (e.g. "x")
//     would occasionally be a no-op if that character was already there --
//     it's derived from the token's embedded timestamp, so this isn't as
//     rare as it sounds.
//  2. Flipping the *last* character of the signature specifically (as this
//     helper used to) is flaky in a subtler way: HMAC-SHA256 produces a
//     32-byte digest, which base64url-encodes to 43 characters with a
//     final 3-character group covering only a 2-byte remainder -- the
//     true last character encodes 4 real bits plus 2 unused padding bits.
//     Go's encoding/base64 ignores those padding bits when decoding
//     (non-strict by default), so about 1 in 4 replacement characters for
//     that position decode to byte-identical signature bytes, silently
//     passing the test without having tampered with anything. The
//     second-to-last character of that final group has no such unused
//     bits, so corrupting it is deterministic.
func flipSignatureChar(s string) string {
	pos := len(s) - 2
	orig := s[pos]
	replacement := byte('x')
	if orig == replacement {
		replacement = 'y'
	}
	return s[:pos] + string(replacement) + s[pos+1:]
}

func TestParseSessionCookie_WrongSecret(t *testing.T) {
	cookie, err := MintSessionCookie(Claims{Sub: "u1"}, "", []byte(testSecret), time.Hour, false)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("mint: %v", err)
	}
	if _, err := ParseSessionCookie(cookie, []byte("a-completely-different-secret!!")); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("expected error for wrong secret")
	}
}

func TestMintAndParseTxnCookie(t *testing.T) {
	txn := TxnState{State: "abc123", CodeVerifier: "verifier-xyz"}
	cookie, err := MintTxnCookie(txn, []byte(testSecret), false)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("mint: %v", err)
	}
	if cookie.Name != TxnCookieName {
		t.Fatalf("cookie name = %q, want %q", cookie.Name, TxnCookieName)
	}

	got, err := ParseTxnCookie(cookie, []byte(testSecret))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("parse: %v", err)
	}
	if got != txn {
		t.Fatalf("got %+v, want %+v", got, txn)
	}
}

func TestClearCookie(t *testing.T) {
	c := ClearCookie(SessionCookieName, true)
	if c.Value != "" || c.MaxAge >= 0 {
		t.Fatalf("ClearCookie = %+v, want empty value and negative MaxAge", c)
	}
}